Comments on a cryptographic key assignment scheme by Tang, Qiang & Mitchell, Chris J
Comments on a cryptographic key assignment
scheme
Qiang Tang and Chris J. Mitchell
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London
8th July 2004
Abstract
In this paper we analyse the security of a cryptographic key assignment
scheme, recently proposed by Huang and Chang, that is designed to provide
time-constrained hierarchical access control. We show that the new scheme
has potential security vulnerabilities, which enable malicious users and at-
tackers to violate the privacy of other users.
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1 Introduction
In [1], Huang and Chang propose a new key assignment scheme designed to
provide time-constrained hierarchical access control. The authors claim that
this scheme satisfies the following four security requirements:
1. The key generation and key derivation algorithms are quite simple.
2. Dynamic access control is easily implemented because most keys and
other information items of the system do not need to be immediately
changed when a class insertion or deletion occurs.
3. The bit-length of the secret information I(i, z) held by users in class i is
independent of the number of classes in the hierarchy and the number
of time periods in the scheme.
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4. After the expiry of time period z, the holder of keying information
I(i, z) should not be able to use this to obtain any keys for any time
periods later than z.
The authors of [1] claim that their system is not only secure but also prac-
tical and sufficiently flexible to be used in an open network environment.
However, we show below that the new scheme has significant potential secu-
rity vulnerabilities, which enable malicious users and attackers to violate the
privacy of other users.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a concise
description of the key assignment scheme. In Section 3, we give our comments
on this scheme. In Section 4, a brief conclusion is provided.
2 Description of the key assignment scheme
There are two kinds of entity involved in the key assignment scheme, namely
the Central Authority (CA), and users, who belong to a collection of classes
arranged in a partially ordered hierarchy. The CA generates and assigns a
key to each class. All secret parameters are managed by the CA. We assume
that the partially ordered hierarchy has m classes ci (1 ≤ i ≤ m), which
are partially ordered by the binary relation ≤. The time during which the
scheme operates is divided into N periods, numbered 1, 2, · · ·, N .
The work flow of the scheme can be divided into the following five stages.
• Initial computation
1. The CA chooses two large primes p and q, where p = 2p1 + 1 and
q = 2p2 + 1, and p1, p2 are two large primes. Let n = pq.
2. For each class ci in the partially ordered hierarchy, the CA ran-
domly chooses the public value ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m) to be small so as to
ensure that
∏m
i=1 ei ≤ n, and so that each ei is relatively prime to
φ(n). The CA then computes di (1 ≤ i ≤ m) such that eidi ≡ 1
(mod φ(n)) (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
3. The CA randomly selects a secret value a and computes ki =
a
∏
cj≤ci
dj
mod n (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
4. The CA selects a function f(t), 1 ≤ t ≤ N , where each f(t) is
chosen to be sufficiently small that 3 ≤ f(t)¿ p1, f(t)¿ q1, and
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gcd(φ(n), f(t)) = 1 (1 ≤ t ≤ N), where x ¿ y means that x is
much less than y. The CA ensures that
∏N
t=1 f(t)
∏m
i=1 ei ≤ n.
5. The CA publishes the parameters ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m), n, and the
function f(·). Suppose that all authorized users know the current
time, and that the total lifetime of the scheme is divided into N
time periods. The other parameters are kept by the CA securely
so that no users can access them.
• Key assignment and distribution
The CA constructs st =
∏N
k=t f(k) (1 ≤ t ≤ N). The key associated
with class cj at time period t is kj,t = a
djst mod n.
When a user is assigned to class ci, and is permitted to access the
keys for this class up to time period z, he is given the information
I(i, z) = kszi mod n.
• Key derivation
From the given information I(i, z) and the public parameters, a user
can derive the secret key kj,t if and only if the class cj ≤ ci and the
time t ≤ z. He computes kj,t as: kj,t = I(i, z)h
∏
ck≤ci,ck 6=cj
ek
mod n,
where h =
∏z−1
v=t f(v).
• Adding a class
Suppose that a new class cm+1 is added to the existing system. The CA
only updates the information I(i, z) of those security classes ci which
satisfy cm+1 < ci. All other information in the system stays the same.
First, the CA randomly chooses a small integer em+1 which is relatively
prime to φ(n), and derives dm+1 such that em+1dm+1 ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)).
The CA then computes the new information I
′
(i, z) = (I(i, z))dm+1 mod
n for the classes ci which satisfy cm+1 < ci, and securely distributes this
secret information to the members of class ci.
• Deleting a class
To delete a class ck from an existing system, the CA discards the secret
data dk and the public parameter ek of the class ck. If class ci satisfies
ck < ci, then the users in this class can compute the new information
as I
′
(i, z) = [I(i, z)]ek mod n. The other users in the system are not
affected.
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3 Comments on the key assignment scheme
It is claimed in [1] that the proposed scheme is secure and appropriate for
key distribution in an open network. However, we now show that the key
assignment scheme has the following two significant security flaws.
1. Firstly, users may collude to obtain keys which they are not individually
entitled to. Suppose gcd(f(t), ei)=1 for some t and i. Then, given
knowledge of ki,t, the key for class ci at time t, and given the value
ast+1 , available to any user who is part of the system at time t+1, then
the secret key ki,t+1 can be computed, as follows.
First note that, since gcd(f(t), ei)=1, it is straightforward to find in-
tegers u and v such that f(t)u+ eiv = 1. Now observe that:
(ast+1)v.(ki,t)
u = (ast+1eidi)v.(adist)u
= (ki,t+1)
eiv.(ki,t+1)
f(t)u
= (ki,t+1)
eiv+f(t)u
= ki,t+1
and the result follows.
2. Secondly, when a class ck is deleted from the hierarchy at time period
t, the authors in [1] claim that it is only necessary to update the key
information of ci, where ck ≤ ci. However it is obvious that at time
period t the deleted users in the deleted class ck can still obtain the
key kj,t for all classes cj for which cj ≤ ck, using the existing key
information. This property makes this scheme unsuitable for many
applications.
In addition, the proposed scheme is also subject to security vulnerabilities in
some specific situations as described below.
1. The scheme has the property that any person, either a valid user or
an attacker, who gets the key material for class ci at time period t can
use it to obtain all the keys for any time period t′ ≤ t and any class cj
(cj ≤ ci). Suppose Alice gets the key material I(i, t) of time period t
for class ci. Then she can compute key kj,t′ = I(i, t)
h
∏
ck≤ci,ck 6=cj
ek
mod
n for class cj (cj ≤ ci) at time period t′ (t′ ≤ t), where h = ∏t−1v=t′ f(v).
This means that, for example, a newly admitted user can obtain secret
keys in use prior to the time of his or her admission to the system.
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This is clearly a property that would be undesirable in many possible
application scenarios.
2. The description of the scheme in [1] does not include a specification of
how the parameters ei and f(t) should be chosen, despite the fact that
inappropriate choices for these parameters compromise the security of
the scheme. To our knowledge, the choice of these parameters should
at least satisfy the following two criteria:
(a) Firstly, it is essential that all the elements ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are
distinct. More generally it should also be the case that ei 6= cej
(mod φ(n)) for any integer c and for any distinct values i, j. Oth-
erwise, the users in class i can always compute the key kj,t = (ki,t)
c
mod n, whether ci ≥ cj is satisfied or not.
To see why this holds, suppose ei ≡ cej (mod φ(n)) for some
i 6= j. Hence dj ≡ cdi (mod φ(n)). Hence
kj,t = a
djst ≡ acdist ≡ (ki,t)c (mod n)
as required.
Not only are the requirements on the values ei missing, but the
authors do not seem to be aware of the necessary restrictions, since
Example 1 from [1] contains insecure choices of values. Suppose
the CA chooses the parameters as suggested in Example 1 of [1],
i.e. ei = 4i + 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ m), and suppose also that m ≥ 6. Note
that we immediately have that e1 = 5 and e6 = 25, i.e. e6 = 5e1.
Then a user in class c6 can always compute the keys for class c1
at any time period t, by computing k56,t = (a
d6st)5 ≡ ad1st ≡ k1,t
(mod n), since 5e1 = e6 implies d1 ≡ 5d6 (mod φ(n)). So if
c6 6≥ c1, then the security of the scheme will be compromised
because the users in class c6 can access the data of class c1.
(b) Secondly, the values f(t) (1 ≤ t ≤ N) and ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m) should
also be pairwise distinct. In fact, analogously to above, it should
never be the case that f(t) = cei for any integer c and any values
i and t.
To see why this constraint is necessary, suppose f(t) = cei for
some i and t. Then
ki,t = a
dist ≡ adif(t)st+1 ≡ acdieist+1 ≡ (ast+1)c (mod n).
However, a user who holds any key for time period t + 1 (kj,t+1
say) can compute (kj,t+1)
ej = ast+1 mod n. Hence, every user who
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is part of the system at time t+1, or any later time, can compute
ki,t (and also ki,s for all s for which cs ≤ ct).
Again, it would appear that the authors of [1] are unaware of these
requirements because of the choices for parameters in the example
given. Suppose the CA chooses the parameters as suggested in
Example 1 of [1], i.e. ei = 4i + 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ m), f(t) = 2t + 15
(1 ≤ t ≤ N). Suppose also that m ≥ 4 and N ≥ 2. First
observe that e4 = f(1) = 17. The key for class 4 at time period
1 is k4,1 = a
∏N
k=2
f(k) mod n. However, any user in any class ci
(1 ≤ i ≤ m), after getting his key at time period t (t ≥ 2), can also
compute the key for class 4 in time period 1 as k4,1 = k
ei
∏t−1
k=2
f(k)
i,t
mod n.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed a new key assignment scheme with time-
constrained hierarchical access control, and demonstrated the presence of
significant design weaknesses.
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